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The Paris Agreement: A New Beginning?  
 
Annalisa Savaresi 
 
The Paris Climate Change Conference was tasked to set the world on a path 
to address the greatest challenge to ever face humankind, by adopting a new 
climate agreement. The outlook for the conference was rather bleak. The 
laborious and increasingly frequent meetings of the body entrusted to draft the 
text of the Paris Agreement, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), had made limited progress. These 
negotiations had eloquently demonstrated the futility of technical negotiations, 
without political consensus on the core elements and features of the new 
agreement. Yet, to the surprise of many, the Paris Conference concluded on 
12 December 2015, with the adoption of a new climate treaty.  
This article reflects on the Paris Conference and on its outcome. First, 
it collocates the conference in the history of the climate regime. Then, it 
explains what Parties were expected to deliver. Finally, it assesses the 
outcome of the conference against these expectations. The article concludes 
with a reflection on where the climate regime is likely to head next, and where 
the Paris Agreement leaves Parties in their efforts to tackle climate change. 
 
From Kyoto to Paris, via Copenhagen 
 
Ever since 1992, Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1  have attempted to agree on measures to 
stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.’2 The international scientific body entrusted to assess climate change, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has indicated that 
such a level requires keeping the increase in global annual average 
temperature below 2° C as compared with pre-industrial times.3 However, the 
UNFCCC has struggled to keep the world within the limits indicated by the 
IPCC.  
The reason international climate governance has proven to be such an 
intractable affair relates both to the enormity of the challenge at hand, as well 
as to the gaping disparity in states’ capacity to tackle climate change. There is 
an inherent disproportion both in the projected impacts of climate change 
across countries and in the means to cope with such impacts, and to 
contribute to climate change mitigation. The main instrument adopted to 
stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere under the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Rio de Janeiro, 9 May 1992, in force 
21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107. 
2 UNFCCC, Article 2. 
3  Martin L. Parry et al., ‘Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ (Cambridge University Press), at 
19.4.2.2. 
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UNFCCC, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,4 fundamentally acknowledged this gap. 
Building upon a static differentiation between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ 
countries embedded in the Convention, 5  the Protocol imposed binding 
emission reduction targets only on the first. With ever growing emissions in 
emerging economies, like China and India, however, the IPCC has repeatedly 
flagged that reducing emissions in developed countries only would not be 
enough. 
To make matters worse, over the years political will behind the Kyoto 
Protocol has significantly faltered.  After the elapse of the first commitment 
period in 2012, it has proven impossible to negotiate new targets for some 
important players, such as Japan, New Zealand and the Russian Federation, 
whereas others, namely Canada and the US, are not even Parties to the 
Protocol. This situation has left the European Union and a few other 
developed countries, like Australia, Norway and Switzerland, in the 
uncomfortable position of being the sole Parties to the Protocol with emission 
reduction targets.6 
In the hope of inducing more states to reduce their emissions, in 2007 
UNFCCC Parties embarked upon the difficult process of negotiating 
measures to further the achievement of the objective of the Convention.7 
These negotiations suffered numerous setbacks and almost collapsed in 2009 
in Copenhagen. Subsequent negotiations opened the way to a new geometry 
of commitments, based on a new approach to differentiation between 
Parties.8 The adoption of a treaty including emission reduction commitments 
for all Parties, however, was but one of the possible outcomes opened up by 
the new negotiation scenario.  
The Paris Climate Change Conference was expected to bring to a 
conclusion this cycle of negotiations, by adopting ‘a protocol, another legal 
instrument or a legal outcome’ applicable to ‘all Parties,’ to be implemented 
from 2020.9 The ADP, the body tasked with the development of the text for 
the agreement, met 15 times to try and complete this endeavour. In February 
2015 the ADP adopted a negotiating text for the Paris Agreement10 - an 
indispensible formality, should Parties decide to adopt the agreement as a 
protocol to the UNFCCC. 
This sizeable 90 page negotiating text was hastily compiled on the 
basis of UNFCCC Parties’ submissions. Subsequent ADP sessions were 
dedicated to trying to turn this chaotic text into that of a legal instrument to be 
adopted in December 2015. Finding a mode of work suited to negotiate a text 
based on the mechanical compilation of Parties’ submissions, with hardly any 
common ground on fundamental choices regarding the nature and the content 
of Parties’ obligations, was a veritable conundrum. A variety of approaches to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto, 11 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005) 2303 UNTS 
262. 
5 UNFCCC, Annexes I and II. 
6 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, not yet into force 
7 Decision 1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1.  
8 Decision 1.CP/17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 
9 Ibid., at 2 and 4. 
10 Negotiating Text, FCCC/ADP/2015/1, 25 February 2015. 
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streamline, cluster and reduce the size of the negotiating text were 
experimented with, but only delivered very limited results.  
The last ADP session before Paris delivered a draft text for a ‘package’ 
including a draft UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) decision and a 
cluttered 31 page draft agreement text, featuring little consensus on any of the 
core elements of the Paris Agreement, and no overall sense of direction.11 
 
Laying the ghosts of the past to rest 
 
Ahead of the Paris Climate Change Conference, many evoked memories of 
the difficult negotiations that preceded the Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference in 2009. There were, however, fundamental differences between 
the negotiation process that preceded the Copenhagen conference and that 
preceding Paris. 
Ahead of Copenhagen, it had been impossible to formally adopt a 
negotiating text. As a result, delegates had to work with a voluminous text of 
over 200 pages, based on an unofficial compilation of Parties’ submissions. 
As no progress on text negotiations could be made, the Copenhagen 
Conference was haunted with rumours about a possible ‘Danish text’ that the 
presidency might table at the eleventh hour. The ensuing break-down in trust 
and diplomatic mismanagement of the process led the conference to conclude 
with a non-inclusive, untransparent, last-minute political agreement, known as 
the Copenhagen Accord, which marked the low-point in the history of the 
climate regime. 
Contrariwise, ahead of Paris, a negotiating text had been formally 
adopted. The 31 page draft agreement text produced by the ADP seemingly 
suggested that the outlook for Paris was more favourable than that for 
Copenhagen. Still, while formally UNFCCC Parties were in a much better 
position than they were ahead of Copenhagen, politically their situation 
seemed just as hopeless. The work of the ADP had shown that consensus on 
how to collectively tackle climate change remained distant, as Parties’ views 
on fundamental substantive issues still significantly diverged. 
The veritable bone of contention undoubtedly was the question of 
differentiation. States’ views still greatly differed on how to distribute the 
burden to mitigate climate change, as well as to provide capacity building, 
finance and technology to those in need. On the one end of the spectrum, 
numerous developed and developing countries converged on the need to 
move beyond a ‘bifurcated approach’ to differentiation, even though not on 
how this ought to be done. On the other end of the spectrum, some 
developing countries vehemently opposed considering moving beyond 
existing differentiation parameters. 
Even more critically, Parties struggled to find consensus on an 
overarching architecture to capture their ‘nationally determined contributions’ 
(NDCs).12 NDCs are meant to provide information on what each Party to the 
Paris Agreement intends to do to tackle climate change. At the aggregate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Draft agreement and draft decision on workstreams 1 and 2 of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action Work of the ADP contact group, available 
at: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/adp2/eng/11infnot.pdf> 
12 Parties’ submissions may be accessed here: 
<http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php> accessed 15 December 2015. 
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level, however, submissions made ahead of the Paris Conference remained 
far from a level of ambition consistent with the 2° C goal. 13  Still, ADP 
negotiations failed to produce agreement on a process to review and adjust 
States’ contributions to enable the achievement of the goal. 
Finally, ahead of Paris, negotiators could not come to a common 
understanding on whether the Paris Agreement ought to be a protocol to the 
UNFCCC or not. With no common vision on all of these issues, the ADP 
process had eloquently demonstrated the futility of technical negotiations, 
without prior political consensus on the core elements and features of the 
Paris Agreement. Delegates in Paris were therefore left with the task of laying 
the ghosts of the past to rest, and adopting an agreement that resolved or set 
aside all contentious issues. On the eve of the conference, few would have 
expected them to succeed in this task. Yet, to the surprise of many, they did. 
The following sections provide a short analysis of the process that led to the 
adoption of the agreement, as well as of its core elements. 
 
The making of the Paris Agreement 
 
When the ADP formally closed at the end the first week of the Paris 
Conference, it produced a negotiating text of 48 pages, with more than 900 
square brackets.14 Given these disheartening premises, it seemed unlikely 
that the Paris Conference would conclude with the adoption of a treaty.  
However, on 12 December 2015, the UNFCCC COP formally adopted 
the Paris Agreement as a treaty. This remarkable outcome was the result of a 
herculean diplomatic effort by the numerous ministers representing the 196 
Parties to the climate regime and gathered in Paris for a whole week. With 
technical negotiations virtually stalled, the presence of ministers was 
indispensible to reach political compromise and bridge differences between 
parties’ entrenched positions, and, ultimately, to deliver the political 
compromise the ADP had been unable to facilitate. In this regard, the strategy 
to hold the high level segment with 150 heads of state and government in the 
beginning, rather than in the end of the conference, turned out to be a 
success. Admittedly, the consensus building process did not start in Paris and 
was facilitated by a plethora of diplomatic multilateral and bilateral gatherings. 
Nonetheless, the pace of progress in the last week of negotiations in Paris 
was truly remarkable, and many rightfully praised the French Presidency for 
its skilful management of the diplomatic process at such a critical junction. 
The outcome was undoubtedly aided also by the unprecedented political will 
underpinning the diplomatic process, which saw 100 between developed and 
developing countries joining efforts and rolling up their sleeves to achieve 
compromise, by working in an unprecedented coalition, which included the 
US, as well as small developing island states and the EU.15 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions, FCCC/CP/2015/7. 
14 The negotiating text delivered by the ADP may be accessed at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/adp2/eng/l06r01.pdf 
15 Annalisa Savaresi, ‘UN Climate Change Negotiations: Last Tango in Paris?’ (EJIL: 
Talk!) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/un-climate-change-negotiations-last-tango-in-paris/> accessed 
15 December 2015. 
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Paris Agreement: core elements 
 
The Paris Agreement is a lean 11 page treaty, consisting of 29 articles and 16 
preambular paragraphs. The treaty text is accompanied by a 20 page COP 
decision that formally adopts the agreement and addresses a number of 
technical and substantive matters to give effect to it. The operative provisions 
of the Paris Agreement cover the substantive issues of mitigation, adaptation 
and means of implementation (capacity building, finance, and technology 
transfer). The remainder of the agreement includes a host of procedural and 
institutional arrangements. The following sections provide an early and non-
exhaustive review of the main previsions in the Paris Agreement, starting with 
an assessment of its legal form.  
 
Legal form 
 
In spite of much speculation to the contrary,16 the Paris Agreement will be 
formally binding upon its Parties, even though the scope of states’ obligations 
will clearly depend on the interpretation of the language in each provision.17 
While in fact some provisions unequivocally assert obligations - for example, 
the obligation of means to pursue domestic mitigation action18 - others are 
expressed in less categorical terms - for example, those concerning 
developed countries’ leadership in undertaking mitigation action, or 
developing countries move towards emission reduction targets. 19  Others 
again have a clearly enabling character, and are merely meant to facilitate 
internationally coordinated action, rather than prescribing it – such as, for 
example, cooperation in the implementation of NDCs.20  
More generally, the Paris Agreement leaves ample leeway to Parties 
on how to undertake action to tackle climate change. Still for the first time it 
enshrines in treaty text a global commitment ‘to reach global peaking of 
greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible,’21 making specific reference 
to the 2°C goal, and even an aspirational reference to the 1,5°C goal.22  
So is the Paris Agreement a protocol to the UNFCCC? This issue was 
not explicitly addressed by Parties, nor in the agreement itself. Yet, the 
provisions of the agreement seem to suggest that it is a protocol in everything 
but name. This conclusion is suggested by the numerous cross references to 
the UNFCCC,23 whose objective and enhanced implementation the Paris 
Agreement explicitly sets out to achieve. 24  Even more evidence in this 
connection comes from the institutional arrangements in the Paris 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 As reported in Joust Pauwelyn and Lilliana Andonova, ‘A ‘Legally Binding Treaty’ or 
Not? The Wrong Question for Paris Climate Summit’ <http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-legally-binding-
treaty-or-not-the-wrong-question-for-paris-climate-summit/> accessed 14 December 2015. 
17 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement: A Primer’ 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2015/12/02/the-legal-character-of-the-paris-agreement-a-primer/> 
accessed 14 December 2015. 
18 Paris Agreement, Article 4.2.  
19 Paris Agreement, Article 4.4. 
20 Paris Agreement, Article 6. 
21 Paris Agreement, Article 4.1. 
22 Paris Agreement, Article 2.1(a). 
23 See, for example, Paris Agreement, Articles 1 and 2. 
24 Paris Agreement, Article 2. 
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Agreement, 25  which largely build upon those made under the UNFCCC. 
Finally, the entry into force of the Paris Agreement is subjected to ratification 
by at least 55 Parties to the UNFCCC, accounting at least for 55 per cent of 
total greenhouse gas emissions.26  
 
Overarching architecture 
 
The Paris Agreement has set the bases for a new ‘hybrid’ architecture27 
bringing together all Parties’ contributions under a unitary framework, and 
crystallizing them in a process enabling periodical review and the ratcheting 
up of ambition. This new architecture largely builds on and consolidates 
developments occurred in recent years. Ever since the ill-fated Copenhagen 
Climate Change Conference in 2009, in fact, the climate regime has 
progressively moved away from the ‘top-down’ governance model embedded 
in the Kyoto Protocol.28  The Protocol relied on a ‘targets and timetables’ 
approach, imposing reduction commitments only on some developed country 
Parties. 29  The political will to support the furtherance of this approach, 
however, has over the years significantly faltered.  
With the slow but unequivocal phasing-out of the targets and 
timetables approach embedded in the Kyoto Protocol,30 Parties to the climate 
regime have increasingly moved towards a ‘pledge and review’ approach to 
climate governance. This new approach entails that UNFCCC Parties 
unilaterally declare the action they are willing to undertake, turning on its head 
the top-down approach embedded in the Kyoto Protocol.31 In this process, the 
UNFCCC machinery has gradually become a ‘notary’ collecting, and 
eventually reviewing the implementation of Parties’ pledged action. This 
‘bottom up’ approach leaves a very wide margin of discretion to states on how 
to contribute to the endeavour of tackling climate change.  
Over the years, UNFCCC Parties have adopted procedures to review 
what they have pledged to do.32 The mechanisms established to address this 
tricky question have only recently been tested, and it is therefore early to say 
how they will perform in the long run. One evident stumbling block, however, 
was that Parties have reported their pledges as they saw fit – for example, 
choosing different years as a baseline to measure their emission reductions – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Paris Agreement, Article 16-18. 
26 Paris Agreement, Article 21.1. 
27 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Durban Platform: Issues and Options for a 2015 Agreement’ 
(Social Science Research Network 2012) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2270336 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2270336> accessed 24 September 2015. 
28 Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1.  
29 Kyoto Protocol, Annex B. 
30 Lavanya Rajamani, ‘From Berlin to Bali and beyond: Killing Kyoto Softly [article]’ 
(2008) 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 909; and Daniel Bodansky, ‘W[h]ither 
the Kyoto Protocol? Durban and Beyond’ (Harvard Project on Climate Agreements 2011) 
<http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/whither-kyoto-protocol-durban-and-beyond.pdf>. 
31 See for example Daniel Bodansky and Elliott Diringer, ‘The Evolution of Multilateral 
Regimes: Implications for Climate Change’ (Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2010) 
<http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/evolution-multilateral-regimes-implications-climate-
change.pdf>; and Daniel Bodansky, ‘A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. 
Climate Change Regime’ (2011) <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1773865>. 
32 Decision 1/CP.16, Cancun Agreements, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, at 44-46 and 63-
64. 
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thus engendering a great deal of confusion as to what they are actually 
committing to do. Another was the absence of a mechanism to ratchet up 
ambition. So, while ahead of the Paris Conference the climate regime had 
made some strides in creating an intergovernmental process to encapsulate 
and review Parties’ bottom-up efforts, more work in this direction was needed.  
The Paris Agreement has arguably addressed this need, by sketching 
out a framework to review both progress towards achieving the global goal, as 
well as each Party’s contribution to it. This review process will build upon and 
enhance extant arrangements under the UNFCCC.33 Although the details of 
largely remain to be determined, the Paris Agreement provides that Parties 
will submit their NDCs every 5 years,34 whereas the first global stocktake to 
inform parties in updating and enhancing their action is set to take place in 
2023, and every 5 years thereafter.35  
The establishment of an institutionalized process to assess the 
adequacy of action in light of science was perceived as an indispensible 
element of the agreement, to ensure its durability, flexibility and alignment 
with the evolution of scientific knowledge. Combined with the non-back-sliding 
clause included in the operative part of the agreement,36 the global stock-take 
ensures the means to ratchet up the level of ambition over time, something 
that was sorely missing in the Kyoto Protocol.  
The Paris Agreement thus builds on and institutionalizes the bottom up 
architecture emerged after the Copenhagen debacle, endowing it with 
measures for the review and the ratcheting up of ambition. Therefore, not only 
does the Paris Agreement provide an obligation for all to make efforts to 
reduce their emissions, it also sets the basis for the building of an architecture 
to review action, and enhance it, when needed. And whilst it is already clear 
that Parties proposed contributions submitted to date are far from sufficient to 
achieve the goal identified in the Paris Agreement, in theory at least there will 
be means to provide the revision of the level of ambition. How this will happen 
in practice, however, remains to be seen. The same may be said with regard 
to the expert-based, facilitative compliance mechanism to be established 
under the Paris Agreement.37 In this regard, the adoption of the agreement is 
just the beginning of a new regulatory season, whereby Parties will flesh out 
the processes and the rules to assist its implementation.38 
 
Differentiation 
 
While the extent of states’ adherence to obligations embedded in the Paris 
Agreement remains to be seen, the agreement potentially provides an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Paris Agreement, Article 13.4 and 13.13. 
34 Paris Agreement, Article 4.9. 
35 Paris Agreement, Article 14.2. 
36 Paris Agreement, Article 4.3. 
37 Paris Agreement, Article 15. 
38 On the law-making powers of COPs, see Robin R Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, 
‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-
Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94 The American Journal of International 
Law 623, at 638-641. 
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historical ‘U-turn’ 39 in international climate governance on the vexed question 
of differentiation.  
The UNFCCC famously built a firewall between developed and 
developing countries, by drawing a neat distinction between groups of Parties, 
relying on a static differentiation based on Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) membership in 1992. With emissions in 
developing countries overtaking emissions in developed ones at the 
aggregate level, this static approach to differentiation has clearly proven 
inadequate to tackle the problem of climate change. Still for years Parties had 
been unable to reconsider the sensitive and divisive question of 
differentiation. 
The Paris Agreement for the first time unequivocally establishes that all 
parties ‘aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as 
possible,’40 asking each and all to undertake and communicate ‘ambitious 
efforts’ to achieve the purpose of the agreement. 41  Furthermore, the 
agreement dismantles the firewall between developed and developing 
countries’ obligations, at least partially. While developed countries should still 
‘continue taking the lead’ in reducing their emissions, and are required to 
provide support to developing countries,42 the agreement also ‘encourages’ 
developing countries to move ‘towards economy-wide emission reduction of 
limitation targets, in light of different national circumstances.’43 
The Paris Agreement therefore requests all parties to make efforts to 
reduce their emissions44 and to submit information on the details. In this 
connection, the agreement introduces a nuanced approach to differentiation, 
providing less stringent requirements for least developing countries and small 
island developing states, while levelling the reporting obligations for the 
others. 45  Again, this levelling is expected to engender a considerable 
secondary rules development process.46 
In other respects, the agreement maintains a bifurcate approach, which 
is nevertheless more nuanced than that under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol. For example, on finance, the agreement maintains the Convention’s 
approach, by imposing an obligation on developed countries to assist 
developing ones both in relation to mitigation and adaptation. Yet, it also 
encourages other Parties to provide support on a voluntary basis.47  
One of the most innovative features of the agreement is an obligation 
concerning the reporting not only of action undertaken, but also of support 
provided and received. 48  Again, the modalities and procedures for such 
reporting remain to be determined. 49  But the agreement establishes a 
technical review process, which will consider both implementation and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon statement in the closing hours of the Paris 
Climate Change Conference, notes on file with the author. 
40 Paris Agreement, Article 4.1. 
41 Paris Agreement, Article 3. 
42 Paris Agreement, Article 4.4 and 4.5. 
43 Paris Agreement, Article 4.4. 
44 Paris Agreement, Article 3. 
45 Paris Agreement, Article 4.6. 
46 Paris Agreement, Article 4.8-4.13. 
47 Paris Agreement, Article 9.1 and 9.2. 
48 Paris Agreement, Article 13. 
49 Paris Agreement, Article 13.13. 
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achievement of NDCs, as well as support provided.50 This review is entrusted 
to identify areas of improvement,51  thus providing an element of novelty 
compared with extant arrangements, which it is eventually meant to 
supersede.52 
 
Climate justice and loss and damage 
 
The preamble of the Paris Agreement contains an unprecedented reference 
to the difficult and vexed question of so called ‘climate justice.’ The issue of 
climate justice has attracted much attention in the debate on the future of the 
climate regime. The term has been used to refer to distributive and corrective 
justice considerations associated both with the impacts of climate change and 
of climate change response measures. It is therefore inherently linked with 
that on equity in the climate regime, and ultimately revolves around how to 
share the burdens associated with a global transition towards low-carbon 
societies. 
In a controversial monograph published in 2010, Posner and Weisbach 
famously argued that that international climate policy should not attempt to 
reflect principles of corrective or distributive justice.53 In fact, the authors 
maintained that competing claims about justice are largely responsible for 
failure to agree on international action to tackle climate change. They 
therefore suggested that climate justice argumentations be left out of the 
climate regime altogether. 
Contrariwise, numerous authors have noted how the climate regime 
inherently deals with the distribution of resources for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, and the allocation of shares in a global carbon 
budget. 54  These authors conclude that solving the climate problem is 
impossible without addressing justice considerations, most notably, those 
concerning the transfer of capacity, finance and technologies to tackle climate 
change.55  
The Paris Agreement has tiptoed around these complex and 
contentious issues. On corrective justice, the Paris Agreement addresses for 
the first time in a treaty the contentious matter of loss and damage caused by 
climate change. There is a great deal of ambiguity in the agreement on how 
this complex issue will be addressed. The Paris Agreement does little more 
than acknowledge extant institutional arrangements, without encapsulating a 
reference to a climate change displacement coordination facility, which had 
appeared in earlier drafts of the text. 
The matter of the organized migration and planned relocation of 
populations forced to move as a result of climate change has long been an 
elephant in the room at climate negotiations. In this regard, some developed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Paris Agreement, Article 13.11. 
51 Paris Agreement, Article 13.12. 
52 Decision 1/CP.21, at 99. 
53 Eric A Posner and David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (Princeton University 
Press 2010). 
54 Friedrich Soltau, Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy 
(Cambridge University Press 2009). 
55 See for example the papers included in Stephen Humphreys, Human Rights and 
Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
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countries insisted, and eventually obtained, that the text of the COP decision 
accompanying the Paris Agreement specify that the agreement ‘does not 
involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.’56 Instead, the 
decision provides some consideration for the issue of displacement, by 
establishing a process to develop recommendations for approaches to avert, 
minimise and address displacement.57 Furthermore, extant institutions are 
entrusted to establish a clearinghouse that serves as a repository for 
information on insurance and risk transfer, in order to facilitate the efforts of 
Parties to develop and implement comprehensive risk management 
strategies.58 
As far as matter of distributive justice is concerned, the picture 
emerging from the Paris Agreement is rather opaque. While in fact the COP 
decision accompanying the Paris Agreement makes reference to a collective 
quantified goal for support to developing countries, it does not go very far in 
establishing new obligations in connection with adaptation and finance.59 
 
Human rights 
 
The Paris Agreement has provided a marginal victory for those advocating for 
building bridges between the climate regime and human rights law, including 
the UN Secretary General Special Envoy on Climate Change, Mary Robinson. 
The adverse effects of climate change threaten the enjoyment of a 
range of human rights, such as the right to life, adequate food, the highest 
attainable standard of health, adequate housing, and to safe drinking water 
and sanitation. Yet, not all UNFCCC Parties have ratified international or 
regional human rights treaties. Numerous states, moreover, have resisted the 
suggestion that human rights treaties apply extraterritorially.60 Thus while 
some human rights bodies have endorsed the view that states may have 
human rights obligations towards those beyond their jurisdiction, most states 
maintain that their human rights obligations are territorially limited and only 
cover individuals, groups or legal entities within their jurisdiction. The latter 
states are, therefore, unlikely to accept that they have obligations to 
undertake positive action to secure the protection of human rights associated 
with climate change impacts beyond their territory. 
A distinction also needs to be drawn between the impacts on the 
enjoyment of human rights caused by climate change, and by climate change 
response measures. The first require states to temper the negative impacts 
on the enjoyment of human rights associated with a changing climate. 
Conversely, with climate change response measures, the matter is rather to 
ensure that adaptation and mitigation actions and policies do not unduly affect 
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57 Decision 1/CP.21, at 50. 
58 Decision 1/CP.21, at 49. 
59 As argued also in Daniel Bodansky, ‘Is the Paris Agreement Historic?’ 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2015/12/13/it-the-paris-agreement-historic/> accessed 14 December 
2015. 
60 Perhaps with the sole exception of economic, social and cultural rights. See Report 
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the enjoyment of human rights. In both cases, human rights law and practice 
may assist in the making and implementation of climate law. 
First, UNFCCC parties could draft and interpret rules to address the 
impact of climate change and of climate change response measures by 
building upon substantive and procedural obligations included in human rights 
instruments. Second, international and regional human rights bodies may 
provide institutionalized pathways to monitor and sanction human rights 
violations associated with climate change and the implementation of climate 
change response measures. International human rights bodies have 
acknowledged these synergies, affirming that human rights obligations and 
commitments have the potential to ‘inform and strengthen’ international and 
national climate policymaking, promoting ‘policy coherence, legitimacy and 
sustainable outcomes.’61 
This potential has been increasingly discussed at climate negotiations. 
The climate regime had already broken new grounds in 2010, by adopting a 
COP decision emphasizing that Parties ‘should, in all climate change related 
actions, fully respect human rights,’62 as well as the need to engage a broad 
range of stakeholders at the global, regional, national and local levels, adding 
that ‘effective participation of women and indigenous peoples are important 
for effective action on all aspects of climate change.’63  
The Paris Agreement is the first multilateral environmental agreement 
to explicitly make reference to human rights.64 Iterations of the draft text of the 
Paris Agreement included references to human rights and the rights of 
indigenous peoples in the substantive part of the treaty,65 which were later 
expunged. The only remaining references to human rights is in agreement’s 
preamble, which mentions human rights, the rights of indigenous rights and 
local communities, and the concept of climate justice. These preambular 
references do not configure new and separate legal obligations for Parties to 
the Paris Agreement. They merely draw Parties’ attention to obligations they 
have already undertaken under the human rights treaties they ratified, or may 
ratify in future, and to relevant customary norms and domestic laws. Even so, 
preamble text has political and moral value, drawing an explicit link between 
treaty obligations under the climate regime and those under the human rights 
instruments they have ratified. It therefore flags that Parties are expected to 
interpret their obligations under the climate regime in light of their existing 
commitments concerning matters such as, for example, public participation, 
the rights of women and indigenous peoples.  
 
Looking ahead: a new season for climate governance? 	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The Paris Agreement will be opened for signature on 22 April 2016, which will 
also mark the celebration of Earth Day. Beyond this symbolic milestone, there 
seems to be much worth celebrating about the Paris Agreement. The 
agreement encompasses new elements, which were missing or inadequately 
addressed in the climate architecture.  
It adopts a collective long term goal on climate change mitigation, to be 
supported by efforts from all Parties. It establishes a periodic process for the 
submission of information on Parties’ efforts, as well as a process for their 
review, both at the individual, as well as at the aggregate level. It has 
dismantled the differentiation firewall, replacing it with a more flexible 
approach, which arguably still hinges on equity. The agreement furthermore 
for the first time recognizes the role of non-state actors in addressing climate 
change, and raises the profile of adaptation, albeit only incrementally. 
Perhaps more importantly, the Paris Agreement seemingly marks a 
new season in international climate diplomacy, with the emergence of a 
cooperative spirit that will hopefully continue in the years to come, breaking 
away from the rancorous and largely circular and sterile rhetoric that has long 
characterized international climate negotiations. The regulatory process set to 
begin in 2016 will reveal whether the Paris Conference has indeed marked a 
palingenesis. 
Whether the Paris Agreement will prove fit for purpose, and how it will 
be implemented, remains to be seen. Yet it has undoubtedly restored faith in 
international climate governance and in multilateralism, creating the premises 
for a process to address climate change in the long term. Though not perfect, 
the agreement represents a fairly balanced compromise, probably the best 
that could be achieved at this time and in these circumstances.  
The Paris Agreement, nevertheless, leaves unaddressed a series of 
difficult questions. To mention just a few, the agreement sheds no light on the 
future of the Kyoto Protocol. The COP decision adopting the Paris Agreement 
ritually encourages Parties to ratify the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol, which includes targets for the second commitment period and is yet 
to enter into force.66 There is little doubt that in the coming years UNFCCC 
Parties will have to decide what to do with this embattled treaty, which 
includes no twilight clause, but has been clearly superseded by 
circumstances. 
Another issue that remains to be determined is the extent to which the 
Paris Agreement will facilitate voluntary cooperation in the implementation of 
Parties’ action, including through market and non-market based approaches. 
While the agreement provides some generic references to these issues,67 the 
devil is clearly in the details, and much difficult negotiating work will be 
needed to craft the rules to operationalize these provisions. 
It would therefore be naïve to expect the Paris Agreement to be a 
miraculous cure for all the maladies of the climate regime. As many delegates 
remarked in the closing hours of the Paris Conference, the hard work lies 
ahead. After Paris, however, climate negotiators can undertake this task in a 
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considerably much hopeful mood, certainly the most hopeful they have been 
for quite some time. 
 
